tal outlook known as the Enlightenment (cf. Shimony, 1997 ). Gergen's case for embracing a postmodern psychology specifically challenges the Enlightenment notions of science and reason as they are used in modern psychology. I find these challenges unconvincing and have briefly indicated why I think this is so with respect to the important ideas of truth and method. I believe psychologists are justified in defending the historical tradition of Enlightenment thinking and should be encouraged to enrich it with the hard-won products of modern psychological research.
The Dead End of Postmodernism
Edwin A. Locke
University of Maryland
Nothing reveals the intellectual bankruptcy of postmodernism better than Kenneth J. Gergen's (October 2001 ) recent article. He claimed psychology and society would benefit if psychologists relinquished their belief in an objective reality, truth, and universal moral values. The fundamental, but not always acknowledged, goal of postmodernism is and has always been to promote skepticism. The objective pursuit of knowledge is to be replaced by "language games" (Gergen, 2001, p. 806) . Why the primacy of language? Because, the postmodernists claim, language is not a reflection of one's inner ideas about the world but something that itself constructs reality. How language gets this magical power is never discussed.
The pursuit of objective values is also prohibited by postmodernism. Gergen (2001) did not deny that people have values; he only denied that values have any foundation that specifies universal principles that should govern human action. Gergen wanted to induce "humility" (p. 809) about values-translation: moral self-doubt. If one takes this seriously, one cannot morally condemn Nazism, totalitarian Communism, the Ku Klux Klan, or the World Trade Center terrorists. Imposing value standards on others, to Gergen, would be neocolonialist thinking. Gergen wanted "global conversation among equals" (p. 812). This would imply that there is no objective moral difference between the terrorists' desire to kill Americans and Americans' desire to live. Gergen (2001) found the concept of "individual rationality deeply problematic, if not oppressive" (p. 805). It is hard to discern what type of rationality would not be problematic, considering that there is no such thing as a group mind. The apparently omnipotent power that human beings cannot transcend, according to Gergen, is something called "cultural traditions" (p. 806). But why can't they? How do cultural traditions get changed except by people, using their individual rational minds, making new discoveries, looking at the facts firsthand, doing their own thinking (Binswanger, 1991) , and reaching their own conclusions?
What does Gergen (2001) hope will result from applied postmodernism? He never told readers exactly, but he used many normative words to describe the potential consequences of applying or not applying postmodernism, such as "benefit" (p. 808), "detriment" (p. 808), "utility" (p. 808), "help" (e.g., p. 809), "hurt" (p. 809), "expand" (e.g., p. 808), "enrich" (p. Postmodernism is the dead end of philosophy; it is a skepticism that refutes itself. Gergen (2001) acknowledged that it makes no claim for the "truth, objectivity, universality, or moral superiority of its own position" (p. 807). All it can offer, by its own admission, is word games-word games that lead nowhere and achieve nothing. Like anthrax of the intellect, if allowed into mainstream psychology, postmodernism will poison the field. Gergen wants psychologists to be "liberated from the task of being mere mirror holders to the world" (p. 810). What this means is that he wants them to be liberated from reality. If he succeeds, then what is left is only the world of fantasy. Given this, it is best to ignore postmodernism and let it destroy itself, as it must in the end. Psychology's history can be studied as a history of fads. Some fads live on for centuries, whereas others receive attention for only a decade. Some research programs are abandoned when their founders DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.57.6-7.458a DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.57. 6-7.458b die, and others when the zeitgeist or political, social, or economic conditions change. There are fads in the mainstream as well as at the margins of psychology. Postmodern psychology, which really never influenced the course of traditional research and, as Gergen (October 2001) emphasized, has never existed in a coherent fashion, was an exciting, challenging, and "enlightening" Euro-American intellectual movement in the 1980s and 1990s. When its critical arguments became repetitive, however, postmodernism was required to turn to positive knowledge. Yet, it was soon evident that this knowledge could not be gained within a postmodern framework.
REFERENCES
The zenith of postmodern discourse passed some years ago. But Gergen (2001) , who has been a major promoter of postmodern psychology and whose analyses are well articulated, insightful, and informed, attempted in this latest article to breathe life back into postmodernism. However, this effort is plagued with what we consider attribution errors. Specifically, we suggest that what Gergen sold as the promises of a postmodern psychology cannot, in any historically informed way, be attributed to the postmodern. In addition, we question whether modernism can be blamed for all the shortcomings discussed in Gergen's article. Finally, we argue that it is problematic to reduce the analysis of power to textual forms of life.
Attribution Error I Gergen's (2001) article is innovative in its focus on the positive consequences of postmodern discussions. However, in the process, he colonized a variety of discourses and represented them as outcomes of the postmodern. He stated that postmodernists ask empirical researchers for the pragmatic implication of their studies (Gergen, 2001, p. 808) . However, the need for pragmatics can be historically traced back much further; for example, Beneke (1853) wrote a textbook on this topic in the middle of the 19th century. It was addressed by the antipostmodernist Holzkamp (1972) as the problem of the relevance of psychology. The idea that psychology should intensify its reflexive deliberations (Gergen, 2001, pp. 808-809) was promoted in an entire book by a foe of postmodernism, the social philosopher Habermas (1968 Habermas ( /1972 . Gergen (2001) mentioned the historical restoration and revitalization of psychology (p. 809); however, these are, of course, ongoing topics for historians of psychology and are regularly discussed in books on the history of the discipline. The need for intercultural dialogue (Gergen, 2001, pp. 809-810) ; the flowering of methodology (Gergen, 2001, pp. 810-811) , which includes the recognition of qualitative research; and the enrichment of practice (Gergen, 2001, p. 811 ) have all been addressed in psychology on an ongoing basis-long before the advent of postmodernism. Similarly, "functional intelligibilities" (Gergen, 2001, p. 810) have been created by traditional as well as critical academics on a regular basis. How can one seriously attribute all these promises to postmodernism, even if one opts for its widest possible definition?
Attribution Error II
We agree with Gergen (2001) that interpretations are located within worldviews. But this also means that the idea that modernism is responsible for a variety of epistemological, ontological, and ethical shortcomings in psychology is based on a postmodern interpretation. If one were to endorse a modern analysis, in contrast, then the course of psychology could be understood as a history of progress with minor or major setbacks. Unfortunately, the intellectual responsibility to provide arguments or evidence regarding which interpretation is more convincing is defaulted because, according to Gergen (2001) , knowledge is about engaging in a "cultural practice of sense making" (p. 807).
Gergen (2001) blamed modernity for all kinds of flaws in psychology (pp. 803-805), but perhaps it is not modernism but romanticism that was responsible (see Malik, 1996) ; perhaps it was a premature alliance of psychology with natural science; or perhaps it was the advent of capitalism and its interest in individual knowledge, responsibility, and action. Unfortunately, these issues cannot be resolved a priori within a postmodern framework; rather, they require detailed intellectual and sociohistorical studies. The need to attribute deficiencies in psychology to a single historical phenomenon such as modernism may be part of cultural sense making, but it does not do justice to historical complexity.
Attribution Error III
It is laudable that Gergen (2001) addressed issues of power, which are indeed neglected in psychological research. Again, he blamed modernism and pointed to the "oppressive potential inhering in the modernist view of individual rationality" (Gergen, 2001, p. 805 ). Gergen himself located oppression primarily within language. No doubt, language can be oppressive (see Chrisjohn & Febbraro, 1991; Teo, 1998) , but equally important are objective social realities, which the postmodern thinker is unable to conceptualize. Gergen rejected the modern idea of an observable real world. Yet, instead of the world, he established language as a reality, a "system unto itself" (Gergen, 2001, p. 805) , a "system that is already constituted" (Gergen, 2001, p. 805) . His location of oppression in language and not in objective social realities is not only an attributional shortcoming but also a form of power, as it neglects concrete experiences of oppression.
Gergen (2001) is right by pointing to non-Western alienation regarding the language games of Western psychology. But is the language game of postmodernism, a EuroAmerican invention, not equally alienating? Gergen cannot fathom that postmodernism is part of the same Eurocentrism that he is criticizing and that, indeed, academics of the socalled third world are critical of modernism as well as postmodernism (see Dussel, 1992 Dussel, / 1995 . Further, one wonders what passionate postmodern social analysis can really offer, in pragmatic or cultural terms, if it merely provides another reading or interpretation of reality.
Conclusion
Within a postmodern landscape, it may not really matter whether researchers commit attribution errors. Perhaps it is considered a problem of the past, academic stubbornness, and epistemological pedantry. However, if knowledge is based solely on sense making, without even considering the quality of sense making, then psychology will become a commodity, much like a product to be bought in the supermarket. Psychologists' tasks will be to hire the best salespersons, create the most intriguing commercials, or invent the fanciest packages for their sense-making goods. They would offer mass-produced items on sale or, for the distinguished buyer, a high-end line of sense-making wares. Although one may observe such elements in the discipline of psychology-regardless or because of postmodernism-we think that such a scenario should not be the epistemological, ontological, or ethical aspiration of contemporary psychology. Habermas, J. (1972 
Postmodern Psychology and Africa

T. Len Holdstock Amsterdam, The Netherlands
In enunciating his vision for the future of psychology, Gergen (October 2001b) followed in the footsteps of some illustrious psychologists of the past. If the discipline of psychology is to actualize its potential, it is important that the points raised by Gergen receive the attention they deserve. He called for diversity at a theoretical and a methodological level-not only within psychology but also between disciplines and cultures-to be respected. He encouraged reflection on the job and argued for the political and societal relevance of psychologists' theoretical and applied endeavors. He recognized the rational accomplishments of the past but stressed that room has to be made to accommodate divergent and creative thinking, as well as matters of the heart. Most important, he argued for the contours of modernist psychology to be reformulated in relational terms. Although these propositions appear to be very attainable, they represent more of a paradigm shift than seems, at first, to be the case. Gergen (2001a) harbors no false illusions, though, about the difficulties involved in changing the focus of psychology. The anthropologist Terrell (2000) has recently also pointed out how difficult communication between scientists within the same discipline, subscribing to different root metaphors, can indeed be.
However, the purpose of this comment is not to speculate on the difficulties involved in implementing such necessary and seemingly reasonable propositions as those put forth by Gergen (2001b) but to highlight and reflect on some aspects of his vision. These aspects are the ones he referred to in his section entitled "The Vitalization of Intellectual Life" (Gergen, 2001b, pp. 808-810) . Implementing the points raised by Gergen will also vitalize psychologists' emotional lives. Gergen (2001b) invited postmodern psychology to enrich itself with the "emerging literatures on Asian and Indian psychology" (p. 810) and the "movements toward indigenous psychology" (p. 810). The events of September 11, 2001 , reinforce in the sharpest possible way psychology's neglect, for instance, of indigenous Islamic and Arabic psychological perspectives. Islam is a belief system underlying the behavior of hundreds of millions of people in many diverse parts of the world. A postmodern psychology has to attend to this neglect in the discipline's past.
An equally urgent need for psychological recognition exists with respect to another part of the world: Africa, the mother continent (Holdstock, 2000) . Even in publications highlighting indigenous psychological and cultural psychological perspectives, Africa remains underrepresented. In formal or even folk psychological terms, Africa, north and south of the Sahara, continues to be the forgotten continent. Not only do several hundred million African people adhere to the Islamic faith, with its own deviations from other Islamic parts of the world, but the inhabitants of sub-Saharan Africa who do not subscribe to an Islamic faith also entertain belief systems and accompanying psychological practices that are unique to the subcontinent (Holdstock, 2000) .
In the African Diaspora, the realities of African Americans have to some extent received a measure of attention in psychology. That this responsiveness represents not much more than lip service has been pointed out by several authors (e.g., Hall et al., 1997) . Others have not merely been concerned about the underrepresentation of African psychological realities but have accused the discipline of actually being psychologically harmful to Black people (e.g., Owusu-Bempah & Howitt, 2000) . Even if it can be argued that psychologists have become more aware of the dangers of racism in the discipline, they have not yet become fully cognizant of the extent of their ethnocentrism (Holdstock, 2000) .
In reaching out to the majority world (i.e., the non-Western) and to Africa specifically, it will be worthwhile for the psychologists of tomorrow to forge closer ties with other disciplines in the social sciences. Anthropology, communication studies, theology, political science, and sociology constitute just a few of these. Anthropology especially, despite its own struggles with ethnocentrism, has a great deal to offer psychology with respect to the understanding of other cultures (e.g., Fish, 2000) . Therefore, humility is indicated not only in terms of what can be learned from the majority world but also from the other social sciences, especially with respect to what these disciplines can contribute to psychologists' knowledge and understanding of non-Western cultures.
Another potential source of enrichment of psychology is offered by the literary and artistic disciplines. Gergen (2001b) referred to the "interpretive imagination" (p. 811) of some of the doyens in psychology's past and described the required shift in psychology metaphorically as one from "scribe to poet" (p. 810). A few years ago, the American Psychologist bravely published Schneider's (1998) call for the revival of the romantic in psychology. Earlier, Hillman (1996) pleaded for a psychology that has "its base in the imagination of people rather than in their statistics and their diagnostics" (p. 33). Of all psychology's shortcomings, Hillman regarded the neglect of beauty to be the most mortal: "A theory of life must have a base in beauty if it would explain the beauty that life seeks" (p. 38). The assertions of people like Hillman, Schneider, and Gergen that psychology must find a way back to beauty receive rather unexpected support in the work of neuroscientists regarding the evolutionary importance of aesthetics (see Holdstock, 2000, for references).
Furthermore, the call for the return of the aesthetic and the romantic in psychology has the potential to provide psychologists with a means to better understand the majority cultures of the world. With respect to Africa, Leopold Senghor, the poet and past president of Senegal, has stated that art is a means by which the world can be explained and understood (as quoted in Holdstock, 2000) . Art for art's sake, unrelated to the social, the cultural, and the spiritual, has traditionally not been common in Africa. Apart from the fact that the psychology of subSaharan Africa can be understood in terms of the various forms of aesthetic expression (e.g., art, dance, music, poetry, theater), the living holism evident in that part of the world has a great deal to offer the formal discipline (Holdstock, 2000) . In the words of Senghor, Africa can contribute uniquely to La Civilisation de l'Universel. It is hoped that psychology can play its part in the actualization of that potential.
Lastly, I question whether postmodern is an appropriate term to herald in the psychology of tomorrow. Postmodernism is load-DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.57. 6-7.460 
